The Colombian Peace Process: Where Now?

The Colombian Peace Process: Where Now?

Canning House, 22 January 2015

Meeting Summary

Panellists:

Professor Jenny Pearce, Professor of Latin American Politics, Director of International Centre for Participation Studies at Bradford University

Kristian Herbolzheimer, Director of the Colombia and Philippines programmes at Conciliation Resources.

Andrei Gomez-Suarez, Associate Researcher, Centre for Criminology (University of Oxford), Sussex Centre for Conflict and Security Research, Lecturer at Los Andres University in Bogota, and member of BACUP and ReD

Jenny Pearce

 

• Jenny spent the last 2 months in Colombia and was struck by the deep scepticism of some sectors of society.
• The elections were very telling, also with regards to those who did not express a preference for or against the peace process: 41% voted in the first round and 48% voted in the second.
• Support for the process has varied. According to Cifras y conceptos, one poll, in December 2014 36% of Colombians supported the peace process and 31% supported a military solution. This was similar to December 2013. But in July 2014 the polls showed 48% in support of the peace process and 19% in support of a military solution, showing the extent to which it oscillates.
• As a general rule though, there are approximately 40% in favour of the process and 30% against it, as a principled stance.
• In Medellin and Bogotá, there are roughly equal numbers in favour and against, while in Bucaramanga, for instance, 68% support the peace process.
• So the questions, rather than ‘do Colombians want peace?’ should be ‘which Colombians want peace?’ and ‘what kind of peace do Colombians want?’ This varies in different areas of the country.
• James Robinson recently came out saying that Colombia should abandon agrarian reform and concentrate on modernisation of the cities, which caused controversy and brought attention to an important issue: the nebulous ways the Bogotá nation-state relates to other regions in Colombia.
• Some of the reasons people are against the peace process are: 1. From the experience of Caguan, some think the FARC can never again be trusted. 2. FARC kidnappings, which have greatly impacted the way people view them. 3. The hermetic nature of the negotiations, which mean the media has a vacuum to fill. 4. The on-going conflict (that there is not a permanent ceasefire).

Kristian Herbolzheimer

 

• It is interesting that those trying to resolve conflict always want to know about peace processes in other countries, which is core to what Conciliation Resources does: sharing lessons from peace processes among different contexts.
• The most important peace processes in recent years include South Sudan, Nepal and Mindanao.
• Nonetheless, Colombia’s peace process is the most significant, for several reasons, including the innovations in the agenda and the process.
• This is partly because the negotiators have taken time to analyse the lessons from previous failures.
• The overall objective of the peace process is to put an end to the armed conflict; the objective of Caguan was to deal with the structural problems in Colombia. This time there are 5 points on the agenda; in Caguan there were a hundred. Then the timeframe was open ended; this time it is not. In Caguan, they never actually began negotiating on substance, they got stuck on process; this time they have negotiated on substantial issues (and, before making public the negotiation process, had already agreed on the agenda items).
• This time, significantly, both parties have explicitly stated ‘we will never win the war’.
• It is important to bear in mind that no peace process have ever been fully implemented or lived up to the expectations it has created.
• Firstly, it has brought land into the global peace agenda, which may be significant for other contexts.
• Secondly, the conversations about transitional justice are important.
• The conceptual innovations in the process are also very relevant.
• The distinction between phases 1, 2 and 3, including the important distinction between negotiations and peace processes, is crucial.
• The notion of territorial peace has also been key.
• Women’s participation, bringing women into the discourses and strategies of both parties, has been very meaningful; even if at times it may have been more cosmetic, it is still significant.
• The opportunities that Phase 3 afford Colombian society are open and free for people to shape, create and own. As such peace is built in Colombia and not dependent on what takes place in Havana. In fact, Phase 3 has already begun, with different civil society initiatives having taken place.

Andrei Gomez Suarez

 

• Norway and Cuba act as guarantors and Venezuela and Chile as accompanying parties. This has proven essential to overcoming impasses during the negotiations, such as the recent Santos´s decision to suspend the negotiations during the capture of Gen Alzate by FARC in November 2014.
• The Colombian government and FARC have held 31 rounds of negotiations following the methodology agreed since the beginning. Namely, meeting for 10 consecutive days behind closed doors. Each negotiation party has 10 delegates in the room, five of which are the main negotiators during each session. Only Cuba´s and Norway´s diplomats are allowed into the room.
• Since August 2014 the parties have been discussing the issue of victims. Before June, Colombians could not directly participate in the rounds of negotiation. During the discussions about victims the parties decided to hear 5 delegations of 12 victims in Havana.
• The parties also agreed to create: (1) The Historical Commission of the Conflict and its Victims made up of 12 respected Colombian academics to write an individual report stating the origin of the conflict and the parties’ responsibilities; the commissioners have already submitted their reports to the rapporteurs; (2) the Gender Commission to review the partial agreements; the first meeting with leaders of Colombian woman organisations took place in December 2014; and (3) the Normalisation Commission to begin discussing DDR.
• Next week the parties will start the 32^nd round of negotiations. Since December, FARC has offered a unilateral ceasefire. According to CERAC, a think tank following the ceasefire, Colombia has experienced the lowest levels of violence related to the armed conflict since records exist. If the unilateral ceasefire comes to an end, it’s not the end of the peace process. However, if a bilateral ceasefire breaks down work it would put at risk the whole negotiation.
• Various government officials and many sectors of the public believe that public endorsement will take place alongside October elections. Nonetheless, Andrei believes that to tie a consultation of the Comprehensive Agreement to regional elections is tricky and that instead of strengthening the legitimacy of the agreement and paving the path for reconciliation, such consultation could be trapped in the banalisation of politics that characterises the Colombian political system, resulting in the further polarisation of Colombian society and the intensification of spirals of violence.
• While the Santos-FARC peace talks are taking place in Havana, the peace process is happening in Colombia. Therefore, this year we will see more and more civil society initiatives supporting the peace process but also opposing it.